Lecture Course on Chapter Three of Bergson’s Creative Evolution

Ecole Supérieure de Saint-Cloud
I. 14 March 1960

In the first part of this work, Bergson aims to present philosophy, and to show the necessity of conceiving of it as genetic philosophy. He thus comes to grips with something essential in philosophy. In effect:

a) philosophy has, prior to him, laid claim to be genetic;

b) cosmology—in ancient metaphysics—is portrayed as genesis;

c) Kantian inspired philosophy—representing modern metaphysics —is also portrayed as a genesis.

The third chapter of Creative Evolution is written counter to all these claims. In passing, it should be noted that for Bergson, to a certain extent, Kantianism acts as a “reference point.” To differing degrees, Kantianism claims to be a philosophy of genesis. To be precise, there is no genesis of the phenomenon, but in fact there is a genesis of the intelligibility of phenomena.

After Kant, with Maïmon and Fichte, the claim becomes explicit. In effect, they both say that it is necessary to pass from a transcendental philosophy to a genetic one.

But Bergson says that this genesis is badly enacted:

— either because it is a genesis of intelligence derived from matter;

— or because it is a genesis of matter derived from intelligence.

In both cases, it is not a true genesis because, taking as a point of departure one of the terms, the other is immediately given, for there is a fundamental reciprocal relationship between the two.

In such a case, how are we to conceive a real genesis?

Bergson says that genesis must be double, in the sense that it must account for matter and intelligence at the same time, and consequently for their reciprocity. How does Bergson present the problem in the first two paragraphs of chapter three?